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SOUL DIVISION AND MIMESIS IN REPUBLIC X
Rachel Singpurwalla
. Introduction
It is well known that in the Republic, Socrates presents a view of the soul
or the psyche according to which it has three distinct parts or aspects,
which he calls the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. Socrates’
clearest characterization of these parts of the soul occurs in Republic
IX, where he suggests that they should be understood in terms of the
various goals or ends that give rise to the particular desires that motivate
our actions. In Republic X, however, Socrates uses the phenomenon of
cognitive conflict about matters of fact to show that the soul has only two
parts, the rational and the irrational. Moreover, he characterizes these
parts in terms of cognitive tendencies, such as forming beliefs on the basis
of reason versus forming beliefs on the basis of perceptual appearances.
In this chapter, I explain how these divergent accounts of the soul and its
parts are legitimate alternative characterizations. A consequence of my
argument is that we should not think of the divided soul as primarily a
division of desires, but rather as a division of cognitive attitudes towards
the world, each of which yields different sorts of desires.
In the first section I lay out Socrates’ two accounts of the soul, and I
raise a puzzle or problem for harmonizing the two accounts. In section
two, I consider and reject one possible solution to the puzzle. In section
three, I provide my own alternative solution to the puzzle and I outline
howmy solution suggests a new conception of the ultimate nature of the
parts of the soul.
.The Puzzle
In Republic IV, Socrates argues that the soul has three parts, or sources
of motivation, which he calls the reasoning, spirited and appetitive parts
(e–c).1 Socrates thinks that we need to posit these parts in order
1 In fact, Plato shies away from using the term ‘parts’ (merê or moria) to refer to the
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to explain the phenomenonof motivational conflict, or the phenomenon
of bothwanting andnotwanting the same object.He begins his argument
by stating that it is impossible for the same thing to do or undergo
opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the
same time. Accordingly, if we find this happening in the soul, we must
infer that the soul has more than one part (b–c). He then goes on
to argue that this very phenomenon occurs with respect to the soul. For
example, sometimes a person is thirsty and so wants to drink. But at the
same time he determines that it is best not to drink, and so wants not to
drink. Since the same thing cannot have opposite inclinations towards
the same thing with the same part of itself, there must be two parts of
the soul: the part with which it thirsts, lusts, hungers and experiences all
manner of appetites, which Socrates accordingly calls the appetitive part,
and the part which desires on the basis of rational calculation, which he
calls the rational part (c–d).
Socrates uses different examples of motivational conflict to show that
there is yet a third part of the soul. Socrates provides, for example, the
case of Leontius. Leontius has an appetitive desire to look at corpses.
But at the same time he is angry and disgusted at his own desire. Again,
Socrates thinks that this shows that there are distinct parts of the soul:
the appetitive part, and the part that is angry at the subject’s desire to
perform actions that are ignoble or shameful, which he calls the spirited
part (e–a).2
But how exactly should we conceive of these parts? And how do they
explain motivational conflict? Perhaps Socrates’ clearest characterization
of these parts of the soul occurs in Republic IX, where they are distin-
guished from one another by their distinct goals or loves. Socrates states,
for example, that the reasoning part of the soul is always aimed at know-
ing the truth, and so is appropriately called learning- and wisdom-loving
(b–).The spirited part is wholly dedicated to thepursuit of victory
and honor, and thus is called victory- and honor-loving (a–b). And
various motivational sources in the soul. Instead, he refers to these using (i) the article
with the relative clause, (ii) adjectives, and (iii) other nouns (genê and eidê).
2 Socrates goes on to ascribe a wide variety of motivations to the spirited part of the
soul, including indignation at the perception that you have been treated unjustly (c–
d), irrational anger (b–c), and the desire for victory and honor (a–b).
Determining what, if anything, unifies the diverse motivations that Socrates attributes
to the spirited part is a matter of some controversy and lies beyond the scope of this
chapter.
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finally, the appetitive part is the source of intense desires for food, drink,
and sex, but since such desires are most easily satisfied by money, it can
be called themoney-loving part (d–a). Socrates goes on to say
that each individual is ruled by one of these parts of the soul, and thus that
there are three kinds of people: philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-
loving. In sum, then, Socrates characterizes each of the parts of the soul
as an attitude of love towards a certain object; and he thinks that when a
part of the soul steadily rules in an individual, that individual organizes
his or her life around the pursuit of the object that that part of the soul
loves. All of this suggests that we should think of the parts of the soul
in terms of the values from which our desires to take particular actions
arise.3 It is the fact that we have these different ends or goals that explains
the phenomenon of motivational conflict.
In Republic X, however, Socrates provides a very different conception
of the parts of the soul. More specifically, Socrates uses the phenomenon
of cognitive conflict, or of having conflicting beliefs about the same thing,
to show that there are distinct parts of the soul, and he characterizes
the parts in terms of cognitive tendencies. This conception of the soul
is introduced during the course of Socrates’ critique of the imitative
arts, and in particular, in his discussion of the effect of painting on the
soul.
Socrates begins this argument by drawing attention to the fact that
the appearance of something can vary with the different perspectives we
can have of it. The same object, for example, can appear to be different
sizes depending on whether we are near or far from it, and something
can look crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of
it, or concave when it is one color and convex when another (c–
d). Socrates notes that in these situations we use rational calculation—
measuring, counting and weighing—to attain the true conception of the
object (d–e). Nonetheless, he argues that sometimes we can have
the following experience:
But when this part [the reasoning part] has measured and has indicated
that some things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the
opposite appears to it at the same time . . . And didn’t we say that it is
impossible for the same thing to believe opposites about the same thing
at the same time? . . . Then the part of the soul that forms a belief contrary
3 Socrates does suggest that there may be more than these three parts of the soul
(c–a).
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to the measurements couldn’t be the same as the part that believes in
accord with them . . . Now, the part that puts its trust in measurement and
calculation is the best part of the soul . . . Therefore, the part that opposes
it is one of the inferior parts in us.4 (e–a)
Painting comes under Socrates’ attack because he thinks it uses tactics,
such as tricks of color, and shading, etc., that make things appear to be
a way that they are not. Thus, painting appeals to that part of us—the
inferior part—that puts its trust in the way things appear as opposed to
the way things are.
This characterization of the soul poses a puzzle for how we ought to
understand Socrates’ conception of the soul and its parts, for it is not
at all clear how this account harmonizes with the account introduced
in Book IV, and elaborated on in Book IX. In the first place, Book IX
describes the soul as having three parts, while Book X describes it as
having two. Is the so-called inferior part meant to refer to the appetitive
part, the spirited part, or some combination of the two? But perhaps
more importantly—and this is the issue that I focus on in this chapter—
Book IX characterizes the parts of the soul in term of the various ends
or goals that motivate our actions, while Book X characterizes the parts
of the soul in terms of beliefs based on calculation versus beliefs based
on appearances. The puzzle here is not simply that Book X attributes
beliefs to the appetitive (and perhaps spirited) part of the soul, for there
is evidence throughout the Republic that suggests that Socrates thought
that the appetitive part is capable of having beliefs about value (I discuss
this claim in more detail later in the chapter).The serious problem is that
Book X characterizes the appetitive part as the source of beliefs about
descriptive matters of fact that seem to have nothing to do with what we
value or how we should act. So, while it might make sense to say that the
appetitive part may leadme to think that the object of its desire would be
good to pursue, it ismuch stranger to think that the appetitive part would
have anything to do with, for example, the thought that a straight stick
is bent. As one commentator, Alexander Nehamas, puts the issue: ‘why
should our desire tell us that the immersed stick is bent?’5 Why would
4 Τ%τ1ω δ/ πλλ6κις μετρσαντι κα σημα.νντι με.4ω ττα εFναι ` "λ6ττω Gτερα
Dτ$ρων ` Yσα τναντ.α 	α.νεται Jμα περ τα τ6 ( . . . ) R κν 	αμεν τ10 α τ10 Jμα
περ τα τ) "ναντ.α δU64ειν δ%νατν εFναι ( . . . ) Τ5 παρ) τ) μ$τρα ρα δU64ν τ#ς
ψυ8#ς τ10 κατ) τ) μ$τρα  κ iν εYη τα τν ( . . . ) LΑλλ) μ!ν τ5 μ$τρ1ω γε κα λγισμ10
πιστεν H$λτιστν iν εYη τ#ς ψυ8#ς ( . . . ) Τ5 ρα τ%τ1ω "ναντι%μενν τ0ν 	α%λων
ν τι εYη "ν μν. All quotes from the Republic are from the Grube/Reeve translation.
5 Nehamas (/original publication ), .
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Socrates have linked together a certain kind of desire and beliefs about
matters of fact based on optical illusions?
One response to this puzzling passage is to think that Socrates is just
being careless.This is Julia Annas’s conclusion. She says:
Plato presumably fails to see that his argument will not work, that desire
has nothing to do with optical illusions, because he thinks of the lower
part of the soul as being merely the trashy and reason-resisting part. In
this passage he always refers to it simply as the worthless part, keeping in
the background the fact that to be consistent with its roles elsewhere it
would have to be the desiring part.6
Perhaps Annas is right that the resolution to this problem lies in seeing
that Socrates is simply being overly impressionistic here. But it is worth
exploring other options before we conclude that the appetitive part of the
soul is simply the grab bag for anything Socrates finds disdainful.
There are at least two other options worth considering. First, wemight
think that Socrates’ characterization of the parts of the soul in terms of
beliefs based on reasoning versus beliefs based on appearances is not
meant to completely overlap with his division of the soul in terms of
different ends or values. So, for example, Neville Murphy and Alexander
Nehamas argue that Socrates’ division of the soul into the part that
forms beliefs based on calculation versus the part that forms beliefs
based on appearances marks a unique division in the soul—a division
within the rational part itself.7 I consider and reject this interpretation
in the next section. Second, we might think that Socrates intends the
characterization of the parts of the soul in terms of beliefs based on
reasoning versus beliefs based on appearances to refer to the rational and
appetitive (and perhaps spirited part), but that he has a principled reason
for linking certain ends, goals, or values with certainmodes of cognition.
I defend this option in the final section of the chapter.
. Republic X: A Division within the Rational Part of the Soul?
One solution to the puzzle that we have been considering is to argue that
a distinct division of the soul is at play in Republic X. Commentators
such asMurphy andNehamas argue that in Socrates’ critique of painting,
where he characterizes the parts of the soul in terms of beliefs based
6 J. Annas (), –.
7 Murphy (), –; Nehamas (/original publication ), –.
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on reasoning versus beliefs based on appearances, Socrates deploys a
division not previously discussed in the Republic: a division within the
rational part itself into its superior and inferior aspects.More specifically,
they argue that Republic X depicts a division between the uncritical or
careless acceptance of the evidence of the senses and vigilant rational
reflection on such evidence.There are two primary pieces of evidence for
this interpretation. The first is that it resolves the puzzle: we do not have
to explain how appetites tell us what to believe about size issues, because
appetites do not tell us what to believe in that regard. Instead, it is a lower
part of reason itself that is the source of beliefs about matters of fact.
Second, this interpretation nicely accords with the most natural reading
of theGreek, according towhich Socrates attributes the conflicting beliefs
to the reasoning part of the soul. Recall that Socrates says, ‘But when
this part [the reasoning part] has measured and has indicated that some
things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the opposite
appears to it at the same time . . . And didn’t we say that it is impossible
for the same thing to believe opposites about the same things at the same
time?’ (e–).8 According to the principle of opposites expressed in
Republic IV, if some one thing is the subject of conflicting attitudes, then
it is that thing whichmust be said to have parts. As Nehamas puts it, ‘Our
principle does not allow us to introduce a distinct object, appetite, and
attribute to it one of the two conflicting beliefs.’9
Although the thought that the division of the soul in Republic X is
really a characterization of the parts of reason provides a nice solution
to the worry about the relation between appetites and optical illusions,
and is consistent with themost natural, although not only, reading of the
Greek,10 I will nowargue that this interpretation of the division presented
8 Τ%τ1ω δ/ πλλ6κις μετρσαντι κα σημα.νντι με.4ω ττα εFναι ` "λ6ττω Gτερα
Dτ$ρων ` Yσα τναντ.α 	α.νεται Jμα περ τα τ6 ( . . . ) R κν 	αμεν τ10 α τ10 Jμα
περ τα τ) "ναντ.α δU64ειν δ%νατν εFναι.
9 Nehamas (/original publication ), .
10 There are two ways of reading this passage, both revolving around the proper
reference of τναντ.α. On the first, it refers to a pair of opposites both of which appear
to the calculating part of the soul. This leads Murphy and Nehamas to argue that it is
the rational part of the soul that is divided. On the second reading, due to Adam (),
–, and –, and defended by Lorenz (), n, it refers to the opposites of
those properties that appear to the senses. On this reading, the opposite of what appears
to the senses appears to reason, and so the division is between reason and some other
part of the soul (i.e. the part that is associated with sense perception). See also Halliwell
(), . I do not decide between these two interpretations here, since, as I go on to
argue, both readings could be construed as consistentwithmy interpretationof themoral
psychology of the Republic.
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inRepublicX is not supported by the text. To seewhy, we need to consider
the remainder of Socrates’ critique of the imitative arts. Following his
critique of painting, Socrates argues that poetry also appeals to the
inferior part of the soul. Socrates argues that poetry imitates human
actions and the results of these actions in terms of the characters’ beliefs
about their well-being and their experience of pleasure and pain (c–
). But, according to Socrates, we are often conflicted in these matters
(c–d). For example, someone may have conflicting reactions to
the fact of losing a child: he may want to lose himself in grief, but also
realize that hemust stop grieving and pull himself together and continue
with his life (e–a). Socrates says that it is reason and law that
encourage him to resist his pain, while his experience of it tells him to
give in (a–b). Again, these conflicting inclinations suggest that
there are two parts of the soul: the best part, which is willing to follow
rational deliberation, and an irrational part, which leads us to dwell on
misfortune and grief (b–d).
Socrates then states that poetry almost always imitates people being
ruled by the inferior part of the soul (after all, that’s much more inter-
esting than watching people behave rationally), and thus it appeals to
and strengthens this inferior part of the soul (e–a). While
my aim in this chapter is not to provide a rational reconstruction of
Socrates’ critique of poetry, we might conjecture that one explanation
for Socrates’ claim that poetry strengthens the irrational part of the soul
is that poetry encourages us to empathize with the character’s point of
view. But Socrates describes such characters as seeing things from the
point of view of experience (pathos) or the way things appear to them.
Thus, poetry, like painting, encourages us to see things from the point of
view of appearances, and thus strengthens the irrational part of the soul.
But what part of the soul does poetry appeal to? There are strong tex-
tual reasons for thinking that poetry appeals to the appetitive (and per-
haps spirited part of the soul) discussed in Books IV–IX of the Republic.
The passage just cited seems to be referring to the familiar distinction
between motivations that are based on reasoning about what is best and
motivations that are more like intense emotional reactions. In addition,
Socrates describes the effects of poetic imitation as follows: ‘And in the
case of sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains that we say
accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same effect on
us. It nurtures and waters them and establishes them as rulers in us when
they ought to wither and be ruled, for that way we’ll become better and
happier rather than worse and more wretched’ (d–). So, Socrates
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thinks that poetic imitation nurtures and waters sex, anger and all of the
desires, pleasures and pains that accompany our actions. But sex, anger,
and all such desires and pleasures are clear references to the desires of the
appetitive (and perhaps spirited) part of the soul. And so Socrates must
think that poetry appeals to the appetitive (and perhaps spirited) part of
the soul.
Nehamas acknowledges this evidence for the claim that poetry appeals
to the appetitive (and perhaps spirited part of the soul). Accordingly, he
argues that Socrates makes use of two distinct divisions of the soul in
the course of his attack on the imitative arts. In his critique of painting,
where Socrates characterizes the parts of the soul in terms of beliefs
based on reasoning versus beliefs based on appearances, Socrates deploys
a division not previously discussed in the Republic, a division within
the rational part into its superior and inferior aspects. In his critique of
poetry, however, Socrates makes use of the familiar division of the soul
into the rational and appetitive (and perhaps spirited) elements. Thus,
Nehamas thinks that Socrates’ critique against the imitative arts should
be understood analogically: just as painting is bad for the soul because it
appeals to an inferior part of reason, so poetry is bad for the soul because
it appeals to an inferior part of the soul (i.e. the appetites and perhaps
spirit).11
This move, however, fails, since there is textual evidence for thinking
that painting and poetry appeal to the same part of the soul. Socrates
describes the poet as follows: ‘ . . . an imitative poet puts a bad constitution
in the soul of each individual bymaking images that are far removed from
the truth and by gratifying the irrational part, which cannot distinguish
the large and the small but believes that the same things are large at one
time and small at another’ (b–c). In this passage, Socrates describes
poetry as appealing to the part that forms its beliefs about the relative size
of objects on the basis of appearances, which he earlier described as the
part to which painting appeals. Thus painting and poetry appeal to the
same part of the soul.
To sum up, then, Socrates thinks that (i) painting appeals to the part
that forms its beliefs on the basis of appearances; that (ii) poetry appeals
to the appetitive part of the soul; and that (iii) painting and poetry
appeal to the same part of the soul. It follows, then, that the part that
forms beliefs on the basis of appearances is the appetitive part of the
11 Nehamas (/original publication ), .
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soul, and thus we should reject the idea that Socrates is introducing a
new division—a division within the rational part itself—in his critique
of painting. This still leaves us with the puzzle with which we began,
however, namely, explaining why the appetitive part of the soul, the part
that is the home of a host of desires, could also be the part that hastily
forms beliefs about matters of fact on the basis of appearances.
. Appetites and Appearances
Perhaps the first step in trying to solve this puzzle is to come to a clearer
understanding of the appetitive part of the soul as described in Republic
IV–IX. In fact, in Republic IX, Socrates describes the appetitive part as
markedly different from the spirited and rational parts of the soul, for
while Socrates says that the latter have a single goal (e.g. honor, wisdom),
the former is depicted asmultiform (d–b). This feature of the
appetitive part is emphasized in Socrates’metaphorical description of the
soul in Republic IX. Socrates characterizes the soul as being composed of
the following creatures, all joined into one: a multi-colored beast with
a ring of many heads, a lion, and a human being (c–e). Socrates
thinks that the human represents the rational part, the lion represents
the spirited part, and the multi-form beast represents the appetites.
But why does Socrates characterize the appetitive part as multi-form?
One explanation is that this characterization is due to the fact that the
appetitive part can desire such a wide variety of things. We have already
seen that the appetitive part desires food, drink, and sex (d–,
d–a). But Socrates also characterizes a person who is ruled
by the appetitive part as desiring a far wider range of objects, including
activities like listening to the flute, physical training, philosophy, politics
and military pursuits (c–d).
Thus, the appetitive part can aim for a wide variety of objects, includ-
ing those associated with the other parts of the soul. We can explain all
of this with the claim that the appetitive part does not really have a sin-
gle, unified goal, or a fixed end, but pursues whatever it simply experi-
ences as attractive or desirable. John Cooper captures this thought nicely
when he states that appetites ‘have their ultimate origin simply in facts of
experience, in the fact that the person in question happens to get a cer-
tain pleasure from doing these things . . . ’12 The fact that we have certain
12 Cooper (/original publication ), .
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appetites is, in Cooper’s language, simply a ‘brute fact’ about our way of
being affected by the physical world.13 That is, sometimes, things just
occur to us as appealing, or strike us as attractive. Thus, the appetitive
part of the soul is the source of desires for whatever seems appealing
or attractive to us. Since any number of things could strike us this way,
Socrates describes the appetitive part as multi-form.
But how should we understand these desires for whatever strike our
fancy? Are they blind desires—simple feelings of attraction that propel
us towards their object? Or do the appetites involve beliefs about the
value of their object? There is ample evidence that suggests that the
appetites do involve beliefs about value. In the first place, in Republic
VI, Socrates states that ‘every soul pursues the good and does whatever
it does for its sake’ (d–e). But if we always pursue what we
believe is good, then this suggests that even when we are motivated by
the appetitive part, we are motivated by beliefs about the good, which
in turn suggests that appetitive motivations involve beliefs about the
good.
There is further evidence that appetites crucially involve beliefs about
the good. In Republic VIII, Socrates describes the process by which an
individual comes to be ruled by his appetites. Socrates describes the
appetites as follows: ‘seeing the citadel of the young man’s soul empty of
knowledge, fine ways of living, andwords of truth . . . they [the appetites]
finally occupy that citadel themselves . . . And in the absence of these
guardians false and boastful words and beliefs rush up and occupy this
part of him’ (b–c). In this passage, Socrates describes the appetites
as capable of affecting our reasons, or our beliefs about value, and this
suggests that they are at the least representations of value, and perhaps
beliefs about value themselves.
Finally, Socrates thinks that reasoning can affect our desires, and
this again suggests that appetites involve beliefs about value. Socrates is
critical of people who do not use their reason, but rather force, to quell
their appetites. He criticizes the individual who relates to his appetites
that he does not want to act on in the following way: ‘he holds them
[his appetites] in check, not by persuading them that it’s better not to
act on them or taming them with arguments, but by compulsion and
fear . . . ’ (c–d). But if Socrates is critical of individuals who do
not use reason and arguments to quell their appetites, then he must
13 Cooper (/original publication ), –.
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think it is possible to use reason and argument to quell the appetites.
And if appetites are the sort of thing that that can be eliminated through
rational persuasion, then theymust involve our beliefs about value. More
specifically, they must be either dependent on or constituted by our
beliefs about value.
To sum up, Socrates thinks that we are always motivated by our beliefs
about the good, and that appetites are capable of affecting our reasons
and being affected by our reasons, or our beliefs about value. All of this
in turn implies that the appetites cannot be purely feeling states, or blind
desires, for it is difficult to explain how such states could both affect
and be affected by our evaluative beliefs. We ought to conclude that the
appetites involve beliefs about value.14
Socrates seems to think, then, the following things about the appetitive
part of the soul:
It is the source of desires based on a variety of unbidden experiences of
attraction (from the multi-form beast and the individual who is ruled by
his appetites).
14 It might be objected here that there is strong evidence that Socrates does not think
that the appetites involve beliefs about value, but instead are blind desires. The primary
evidence for this claim comes from Republic IV, where Socrates describes the appetites
as being solely for their natural object; so, for example, thirst is for drink, and hunger
is for food (d–e). Socrates proceeds to say that we should not be dissuaded from
this conception of the appetites by the view that everyone desires good things (a–).
Commentators such as Irwin (), , Penner () andReeve (), – have
taken this to be a direct repudiation of the thesis, defended in other Platonic dialogues,
such as the Protagoras (c–d) and the Gorgias (a–b), that we always desire
what we believe to be good. Thus, these commentators have taken this to mean that
Socrates thinks that the appetitive part is the source of blind desires, while the rational
part (at least) is the source of desires for what we believe to be good. But this passage does
not provide conclusive evidence that the appetites are independent of our beliefs about
value. In the first place, Socrates is cautioning his audience against the idea that the claim
that all desires are for good things constitutes an objection to the claim that appetites are
distinguished from other sorts of desires by being solely for their object.This leaves wide
open the possibility that Socrates thinks that the claim that we all desire what we believe
to be good is true, but just does not provide an objection to the thesis on the table. And
he would be right to think so: for even if we all desire what we believe to be good, it does
not follow that there are not different kinds of desires. So, for example, as Republic IX
suggests, desires might be classified in terms of their various objects. Or, they might be
classified in terms of their origins: Socratesmight think that some desires arise as a result
of a process of reasoning about value, while some desires do not arise due to a process of
reasoning. Neither of these options precludes the idea that each of these different kinds of
desire may involve beliefs about value. For other commentatorswho defend the idea that
appetitive desires are not independent of our beliefs about value see Bobonich (),
ff., Carone (), Lesses (), and Price (), –.
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It is a source of beliefs about value (from the fact that Socrates says that we
always pursue what we believe to be good, and from the fact that appetites
affect and are affected by our reasoning, or by our beliefs about value).
It is prone to form judgments based on appearances (from Republic X).
How can we synthesize these apparently disparate features of the appeti-
tive part?
A reasonable way to synthesize these features of the appetitive part of
the soul is to say that experiences of attraction are appearances of value;
and the appetitive part is the part of us that is prone to form beliefs or
judgments of value on the basis of these appearances of value; and these
beliefs about value are the appetites.15
This account of the appetitive part of the soul nicely resolves the
puzzle with which we began. We wanted to know why Socrates thought
that it was legitimate to characterize the appetitive part of the soul—the
part that is the source of a host of appetites—as the part that forms its
beliefs on the basis of appearances. But now that we have seen that brute
experiences of attraction are appearances of value, and that appetites
are beliefs about value based on appearances, we can understand why
Socrates thought that the Republic X characterization was a legitimate
alternative way of characterizing the appetitive part of the soul.
This interpretation suggests a new way of conceiving of the appetitive
part of the soul, and, as a consequence, of the parts of the soul in general.
If this account is correct, then we should not think of the appetitive
part as fundamentally the source of a host of blind desires, but rather
as fundamentally a cognitive tendency—the tendency to form beliefs on
the basis of appearances. The fact that the appetitive part of the soul is
appearance-responsive in this way explains Socrates’ claim that it is both
the source of beliefs about matters of fact that have nothing to do with
value, and the source of the appetites, which are beliefs about value.
On this view, Socrates thinks that the fact we have certain cognitive
tendencies explains the fact that we have certain ends, goals or values.
So, the fact that the appetitive part is appearance-responsive, or forms
its judgments on the basis of appearances alone, explains why Socrates
characterizes it as not really having a fixed, single end. For this part of
the soul gives rise to appetites on the basis of appearances alone, or on
the basis of whatever simply appears good. But recall that appearances
15 See Moss () and () for an alternative but similar account of the appetites
and the parts of the soul.
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of value just are attractions. Thus, there are as many appearances of
value as there are interests and attractions. And if we go no further than
the appearances in choosing our actions, then it follows that we may
(depending on the strength and consistency of our attractions) have a
wild variety of ends.
The claim that Socrates thinks that the fact that we have certain
cognitive tendencies explains why we have certain ends is supported by
Socrates’ famous allegory of the cave. In the cave allegory, Socrates likens
our human condition to that of prisoners chained so that they are facing
the wall of the bottom of a cave. Moreover, these prisoners mistake the
shadows that they see on the wall in front of them for reality; that is,
they form beliefs about the world on the basis of how things appear
alone.These prisoners, then, cannot get beyond the appearances (a–
c).
Socrates describes the journey out of the cave—the journey towards
freedom from dependence on the appearances—as an intellectual jour-
ney. He says that we should compare the journey to the image of the line,
which outlines increasingly sophisticated kinds of reasoning, and thus
that we should ‘interpret the upward journey [out of the cave] and the
study of things above [the forms] as the upward journey of the soul to
the intelligible realm’ (b–). But Socrates also says that the individ-
ual whomakes this journey undergoes a radical transformation of values.
He no longer values the things that are considered desirable in the cave,
nor does he care to be held in honor in the cave, and indeed he pities the
people who live there (c–d). Instead, his desire is focused on the
sun, which we should understand as the form of the good, the real good
(c–d).
Thus, the cave suggests that Socrates thinks that using increasingly
sophisticated modes of reasoning to understand the world, including
what is truly valuable, affects our choice of goals.16 This, again, sup-
ports the view that Socrates thinks that the parts of the soul are fun-
damentally cognitive tendencies towards more and less sophisticated
forms of reasoning, and that it is this feature of them that explains why
the various parts are associated with their respective ends, goals or val-
ues.
16 This view flows naturally from three Platonic tenets: (i) we have a motivational
orientation towards the good, and (ii) there is a real good, and (iii) reason discovers the
good.
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Now, someone might object here that this cannot be the complete
picture, since Socrates thinks that it is our appetites that affect the way
we think and conceive of the world, and not the other way around.17
There is evidence for this view in the cave allegory. Recall that Socrates
states that the prisoners in the cave are chained such that they cannot see
anything other than the shadows, and that they mistake these shadows
for reality. In short, they are trapped in the world of appearances. Later,
Socrates suggests that we should think of the prisoner’s soul as chained
by its appetites; he says, ‘feasting, greed, and other such pleasures . . . like
leaden weights, pull its vision downward’ (b–). This implies that it
is our experiences of attraction, or our urges, that keep us focused on the
world of appearances, and so affect the way that we think.
And indeed, this view has some psychological plausibility. It seems
plausible that strong attractions prevent us from looking past the appear-
ances, or from engaging in more sophisticated forms of reasoning about
the value of the object of our attraction. If I find a piece of chocolate cake
very appealing, then this urge might leadme to focus on the appearances
alone, and not entertain thoughts about how the cake might be harmful
and not really good.This in turnmakes me prone to assent to the appear-
ances. Strong wants do tend to narrow our attention and thus affect our
judgments.
We should not, however, accept the claim that Socrates thinks that it
is the ends or goals of a part of the soul that are fundamental and thus
that explain its cognitive tendencies, for this view cannot explain the fact
that the appetitive part has beliefs about size issues that have nothing to
do with what we desire or what to value. Again, to return to our earlier
question: what desire or want could possibly make me believe that a
straight stick in the water is bent or that a large object in the distance
is small?
This does not, however, mean that we should ignore the insights of
this objection—the insight, that is, that our attractions can affect how we
reason.What all of this suggests is that Socrates probably thinks that there
is some kind of a feedback loop. That is, focusing on appearances leads
me to have appetitive goals, which then keepsme focused on theworld of
appearances, which then leads me to have appetitive goals, and so forth
17 Reeve (), – defends a variant of this view. He is interested in mapping
different ends or goals onto the cognitive faculties described in the line in Republic VI;
and he argues that the different ends determine the sort of cognitive faculties used in their
pursuit.
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and so on. Nonetheless, since it is the claim that the appetitive part is
first and foremost a cognitive tendency that can explain Socrates’ claim
that the appetitive part forms beliefs based on visual appearances, we
ought to conclude that the appetitive part is first and foremost a cognitive
tendency, or a way of seeing and thinking about the world, where this
explains, at least in part, why we adopt certain ends.
A consequence of the view that we should understand the parts of
the soul as primarily a division of cognitive attitudes is that in a sense,
Nehamas and Murphy may have been right: Republic X does point us in
the direction of the idea that Socrates is interested in dividing reason into
its superior and inferior aspects. The division of reason is, however, also
at the same time the familiar division into the reasoning and appetitive
(and perhaps spirited) part of the soul. If I am correct about this, then the
picture of the soul in the Republic should be moved much closer to that
given in the Protagoras, where the soul is depicted as having two primary
sources of motivation, one due to the measuring art, and one due to the
power of appearances (c–e).18
Of course part of what determines whether or not this is the correct
conception of the soul in the Republic is whether it can explain why
Socrates attributes certain goals to the spirited and rational parts of the
soul. Thus, on the likely assumption that the inferior part of the soul
in Republic X includes the spirited part, we need to show how focusing
on appearances might lead one to adopt spirited ends, and in what way
this process is distinct from the adoption of appetitive goals.19 Similarly,
we need to see how the mode of reasoning associated with the rational
part might lead one to adopt the goals that Socrates associates with
the reasoning part of the soul. I do think, however, that the arguments
presented here provide strong reason for adopting the view that the
appetitive part of the soul is first and foremost a certain sort of cognitive
18 I provide an interpretation of the moral psychology of the Protagoras that coheres
with the account of the moral psychology of the Republic presented here in Singpurwalla
().
19 We should note that in theDeAnima, Aristotle divides the soul into the rational and
non-rational parts; and he assigns rational wish to the rational part, and appetitive and
spirited desires to the non-rational part (b). Additionally, Socrates in the Phaedrus
likens the soul to the union of a teamof winged horses and their charioteer. It is, of course,
reasonable to think that the chariot driver represents the rational part, and the two horses
represent the spirited and appetitive elements (aff). This picture coheres nicely with
the claim that rational desires belong to their own part of the soul (the rational part),
while spirited and appetitive desires belong to another (the non-rational).
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tendency, and thus give support for thinking that Plato’s conception of the
ultimate nature of the soul and its parts should be understood in these
cognitive terms.20
20 I am indebted to many friends and colleagues for comments on earlier versions of
this paper, includingAnneMargaret Baxley, Fritz-GregorHerrmann, RachanaKamtekar,
Chris Kelly, Farid Masrour, Michelle Montague, Michael Morgan, Cindy Schossberger,
Clerk Shaw, Christopher Shields, and ShelleyWilcox. I would also like to thank audience
members at the Tenth Annual Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy in , and
the University of Colorado at Boulder, the University of Maryland at College Park, and
Wesleyan University in .
